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Education and debate
Using high quality clinical databases to complement the
results of randomised controlled trials: the case of
recombinant human activated protein C
Andrew Padkin, Kathy Rowan, Nick Black
Understanding the generalisability (or applicability) of
the results of randomised controlled trials in typical
clinical practice remains one of the key methodologi›
cal challenges to achieving a more scientific basis for
health care.1 Little effort is made to use a scientific
approach to assess generalisability, document the use
of a new intervention systematically, or determine
whether the trials’ results are replicated in real life,
either in the original patient groups studied or in other
patients who receive the intervention.
To explore these issues, we use a case study to
describe the practical difficulties that exist for
policymakers and clinicians in interpreting the results
of a randomised controlled trial evaluating recom›
binant human activated protein C, a new drug for
treating severe sepsis in intensive care patients. We sug›
gest how an existing, high quality, clinical database
could provide information on the generalisability of
the trial results and on the likely financial conse›
quences of the drug’s introduction, and how it could be
used to monitor the diffusion and effectiveness of the
drug in typical clinical practice.
Limitations of randomised controlled
trials
Evidence based medicine has focused on understand›
ing the factors affecting the internal validity of
randomised controlled trials but has paid far less
attention to their generalisability. This is reflected in the
many instruments for assessing the quality of trials,
which concentrate predominantly on identifying
factors that may challenge internal validity.2 In many
randomised controlled trials both the setting and the
patients studied differ from those in typical clinical
practice. So, even if the evaluated intervention provides
significant benefit in the patients studied, whether and
for whom it should be used in routine practice remains
a matter of judgment. Information is rarely presented
or available to help determine an appropriate policy.3
Consequently, the diffusion of a new intervention into
routine practice is often haphazard, both within and
outside the patient group in which the trial was
performed. Even in the highly regulated arena of com›
mercial pharmaceutical research there are many
examples of drugs in common use outside their
licensed indications.4 5
New treatment for severe sepsis
Severe sepsis is common in intensive care and has a
high associated mortality. Previous epidemiological
studies have been hampered by the multiplicity of defi›
nitions used for severe sepsis and the diversity of
patient groups studied. The search for a treatment for
severe sepsis has been a high priority for many years,
but, despite over 40 trials of inflammatory modulators,
no effective intervention has been identified.
Recently, results from a major international
randomised controlled trial (the PROWESS trial) of a
potential agent for treating severe sepsis in intensive
care were reported.6 The definitions used for severe
sepsis (see box) were based on those developed by the
American College of Chest Physicians and Society of
Critical Care Medicine7 and covered a wide spectrum
of illness severity. The trial was stopped after interim
analysis showed that treatment with recombinant
human activated protein C (also called drotrecogin alfa
(activated)) was associated with lower 28 day mortality
from all causes than placebo (24.7% v 30.8%). This
translated into a number needed to treat of 16 to pre›
vent one death by 28 days, considerably lower than the
number needed to treat of 56 to prevent one death by
35 days for intravenous thrombolysis in acute myocar›
dial infarction8—a widely accepted benchmark of effec›
tive clinical practice.
Summary points
Randomised controlled trials may be performed
in atypical settings with atypical patients, making
it difficult to assess the generalisability of the
results
High quality clinical databases could be used to
facilitate this assessment and to provide evidence
of clinical effectiveness in typical clinical practice
The case for using a high quality clinical database
in the assessment of recombinant human
activated protein C, a new drug for treating severe
sepsis in intensive care patients, provides an
important topical example
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As activated protein C heads towards the UK market,
the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) is
likely to be asked to decide whether the NHS should
provide it and, if so, for which patients. If a decision has
not been reached by the time the drug is marketed in
early 2002 individual doctors will have to decide on the
use of the drug for individual patients.
Possible policy responses
There are four possible policy responses to the
PROWESS trial results: the results could be (a) rejected
because they are not deemed valid, (b) rejected because
they are not generalisable, (c) accepted as indicating
use of the drug for all patients similar to those in the
trial, or (d) accepted with more stringent indications as
to who should receive the drug. We consider each of
these options with respect to defining the further
information necessary to make an informed decision
and to the way in which a high quality clinical database
could help with the decision.
Reject results as invalid
Although, as yet, there have been few challenges to the
trial’s internal validity, the question as to whether the
28 day survival advantage translates into improved
long term survival without a substantive reduction in
quality of life remains unanswered. Further follow up
of the trial patients by the PROWESS investigators
could provide an answer to this question. Without this
information, the cost effectiveness of the drug remains
uncertain, although it should be remembered that
patients with severe sepsis are often young and that
recovery from the acute episode is likely to be followed
by many years of normal life.
Reject results as not generalisable
Can the trial results be generalised to intensive care
practice in Britain? One of the trial’s strengths is that it
was pragmatic9: it did not standardise other interven›
tions and so was designed to investigate the benefit of
activated protein C in typical clinical practice.
However, despite being conducted in 164 centres in 11
countries, the trial did not include any British centres,
the reasons for which are unknown. The generalisabil›
ity of the results depends on whether the patients stud›
ied in the trial can be considered representative of
patients with severe sepsis in British intensive care
units. This question has two components: whether
patients with severe sepsis in British intensive care
units are similar to those recruited into the trial, and
whether aspects of intensive care other than the use of
activated protein C are similar in Britain to those in the
trial centres.
A first estimate of the generalisability of the trial
results can be made by comparing the outcomes for
the trial’s control group with those for patients who
satisfy the same criteria for severe sepsis in British
intensive care units. Fortunately, Britain is one of the
few countries in which it is possible to investigate these
components of generalisability immediately, without
having to collect relevant data prospectively. About
67% of adult general intensive care units in England,
Wales, and Northern Ireland participate in a national
comparative audit of patient outcome from intensive
care, the case mix programme, coordinated by the
Intensive Care National Audit and Research Centre
(ICNARC). Data on patients from their first 24 hours in
an intensive care unit and on their outcome at
discharge from the unit and from hospital are collected
according to precise rules and definitions and
extensively validated before being included in the
national database.10
Using this database, we found that 28% of all inten›
sive care admissions between 1996 and 2000 met the
definition for severe sepsis adapted from the
PROWESS trial.11 Hospital mortality was 44.7%, far
higher than the 30.8% mortality at 28 days seen in the
trial’s control group. This may be due to differences in
Definition of severe sepsis used in PROWESS
trial
6
• Known or suspected infection
Plus
• Three or more signs of systemic inflammation:
Core temperature >38°C or <36°C
Heart rate >90 beats/min
Respiratory rate >20 breaths/min or arterial carbon
dioxide tension (Paco2) <32 mm Hg or mechanical
ventilation for an acute process
White cell count >12 000/mm3 or <4000/mm3
Plus
• At least one sepsis induced organ dysfunction
(organ dysfunctions may occur in cardiovascular,
respiratory, renal, haematological, or metabolic
systems)
Severe sepsis covers a wide range of illness severity, from single
organ dysfunction (top) to multiple organ dysfunction (bottom).
(Reproduced with subjects’ permission)
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the populations studied; differences in the baseline
characteristics (demographic, diagnostic, illness sever›
ity or comorbidities); differences in the outcomes
measured (hospital v 28 day mortality); or differences
in other interventions used (apart from activated
protein C). Using individual patient data from
PROWESS control patients and patients from the case
mix programme, adjustment could be made for these
differences to provide an accurate comparison
between the outcomes for the trial control patients and
similar patients in British intensive care units.
Accept results and recommend drug for all similar
patients
The third possible policy response is acceptance of the
validity and generalisability of the PROWESS trial
results with the recommendation that the drug be used
for all patient groups studied in the trial. The financial
implications of such a policy are considerable. The
absolute number of patients who would be eligible for
activated protein C is unknown, but if only half of the
28% of patients admitted to intensive care who met the
definition for severe sepsis used in the PROWESS trial
were eligible to receive the drug when the trial
exclusion criteria were also considered, then 10 000
patients a year might be eligible in England and Wales
alone. The manufacturers have not yet revealed the
cost of the drug, but HA›1A (Centoxin), another drug
marketed for treating severe sepsis in 1992, cost £2200
per treatment course.12 It is not unreasonable to
suppose that activated protein C might cost between
£3000 and £5000 per course, leading to a total poten›
tial cost of £30m›£50m a year in England and Wales,
without including other patients who might also be eli›
gible for treatment.
Accept results but set more stringent limits as to
who should receive the drug
It might be suggested that use of the drug should be
limited to those patients who would be expected to
gain maximum benefit. Unfortunately, this fourth pos›
sible policy response would require data that are not
available. The only source of such information would
be subgroup analyses of the PROWESS trial. The dan›
gers of such analyses are well recognised, and any
results would have to be interpreted with great
caution.13
The risks of limiting the use of activated protein C
on the basis of subgroup analysis are compounded
because the possibility of doing further large
randomised controlled trials is fading. As current
evidence suggests that treatment leads to the survival
of one extra person for every 16 treated, it may be
deemed unethical to deny activated protein C to
control patients with similar characteristics to those in
the PROWESS trial.
Using clinical databases to record typical
clinical practice
In situations where a randomised controlled trial is not
possible, a non›randomised approach should be
considered.14 A well designed non›randomised study
performed to coincide with the launch of activated
protein C could not only monitor use of the drug but
also provide information on how effective it is in typi›
cal clinical practice in predefined subgroups. This
would not only supplement the subgroup analysis of
data from the PROWESS trial but also permit
investigation of those groups not included in the trial
but for whom activated protein C will undoubtedly be
used (such as patients under 18 years of age). Such a
study would need to be large and to be started soon.
This could be achieved by the intensive care units that
contribute to the case mix programme because the
data collection systems already exist and participating
clinicians are familiar with the national aggregated
database being used for research.15
Conclusions
Although this case study describes one particular drug,
it illustrates a common problem in healthcare
policymaking. Insufficient attention has been paid to
the generalisability of the results of randomised
controlled trials which, all too often, are conducted
with patients and services that are atypical. Fortunately,
a high quality clinical database exists for intensive care
in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. This can be
used to test the generalisability of the information
available on the effectiveness of activated protein C
before an evidence based decision is made about its
use. The case mix programme database could not only
be used to aid the interpretation of PROWESS trial
results but also to provide detailed evidence on the
likely financial implications in typical clinical practice,
to monitor the drug’s diffusion into clinical practice,
and to measure its clinical effectiveness in the real
world. Integrating the results of a randomised control›
led trial with those available from a high quality clinical
database provides a powerful model for the assessment
of healthcare interventions as they pass from trials into
clinical practice.
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The future of health care in Canada
Steven Lewis, Cam Donaldson, Craig Mitton, Gillian Currie
Canada’s healthcare system, commonly known as
Medicare, took shape in the 1950s and ’60s. Founded
on the principles of universality, accessibility, compre›
hensiveness, portability, and public administration, the
system was considered the crown jewel of Canadian
social programming and enjoyed both massive public
support and international admiration. Its achieve›
ments seemed particularly impressive compared with
those of its US neighbour, which realised none of these
five principles despite much higher costs. The issue
seemed settled, and health care ranked very low on
policymakers’ list of concerns, particularly at the
national level.
Times have changed, and a decade of turbulence
has transformed Medicare from icon of Canadian
values and organisational know how to an apparent
state of crisis.1 A further blow to an already›shaken col›
lective psyche was the publication of the World Health
Organization report that rated Canada’s healthcare
system 30th in the world in terms of achievement rela›
tive to potential.2 (The media chose to downplay its
seventh place ranking in terms of goal attainment,
further promoting the air of crisis.) Has Medicare gone
wrong, and, if so, what went wrong?
Culture, context, and recent history
To understand the evolution of Canadian health care,
one must understand its constitutional arrangements
and political culture. Canada is a federal system whose
powers are formally and sometimes contentiously
divided between the national and provincial govern›
ments. Section 92 of the Constitution Act of 1982 con›
firms the British North America Act of 1867
assignment of responsibility for (most) health care to
the provinces. The national government asserts
authority outside its formally assigned realms through
“fiscal federalism”—that is, money. Box 1 outlines the
legal structure of Canadian health care.
The fiscal storm clouds that gathered during the
1980s intruded on the calm waters of Canadian health
care. Anxious to get its fiscal house in order, the federal
government in Ottawa accelerated its unilateral cuts to
transfer payments to the provinces, which in turn faced
severe pressures to balance their budgets. The history
of sharing healthcare costs between Ottawa and the
provinces is long and complex. Stripped to its basics,
what began in the 1960s as in essence a 50›50 split in
costs had by 1995, through a series of sometimes
negotiated and sometimes unilateral changes, changed
to a national government share of as low as 16%
(according to the provinces) to 32% (according to the
national government, which adds to its direct cash con›
tributions the money that the provinces now collect as
a result of the transfer of “tax points” from Ottawa).3
These cuts led the provinces to impose, for the first
time, real restraint on healthcare spending—a small but
real per capita decline for a four year period ending in
1996›7. This had a highly destabilising effect on a sys›
tem accustomed to growing by 2.5% (in real terms)
annually from 1975 onward.4 In concert with this
abrupt halt to spending growth the provinces,
responding to a spate of high level reviews of the
healthcare system conducted in the 1980s and early
1990s, launched massive structural reforms.5 Chief
among these was regionalisation that both devolved
operating authority to subprovincial geographic area
boards and consolidated or eliminated a large number
of local programme specific boards.6
The privatisation challenge
The issue of privatisation in many ways encapsulates
the often highly charged debates about health care in
Canada. Historically, a minority of providers and
citizens have advocated a private, parallel healthcare
system, though this has never been publicly supported
by any political party. But privatisation has many
meanings, and the system has always been a
Summary points
Canadians continue to favour a publicly funded,
comprehensive healthcare system but seem
pessimistic about whether it is sustainable
Increasing privatisation, in numerous forms, has
crept into the system
Numerous reports have called for substantial
reforms, but achieving a consensus based solution
remains elusive
To date, the government has simply given more
resources to the system, while largely ignoring
calls to enhance its comprehensiveness and
accessibility
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